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A B S T R A C T
The prevalence of the Internet and cloud-based applications, alongside the technological
evolution of smartphones, tablets and smartwatches, has resulted in users relying upon
network connectivity more than ever before. This results in an increasingly voluminous foot-
print with respect to the network traffic that is created as a consequence. For network forensic
examiners, this traffic represents a vital source of independent evidence in an environ-
ment where anti-forensics is increasingly challenging the validity of computer-based forensics.
Performing network forensics today largely focuses upon an analysis based upon the In-
ternet Protocol (IP) address – as this is the only characteristic available. More typically, however,
investigators are not actually interested in the IP address but rather the associated user (whose
account might have been compromised). However, given the range of devices (e.g., laptop,
mobile, and tablet) that a user might be using and the widespread use of DHCP, IP is not a
reliable and consistent means of understanding the traffic from a user. This paper pres-
ents a novel approach to the identification of users from network traffic using only the meta-
data of the traffic (i.e. rather than payload) and the creation of application-level user
interactions, which are proven to provide a far richer discriminatory feature set to enable
more reliable identity verification. A study involving data collected from 46 users over a two-
month period generated over 112 GBs of meta-data traffic was undertaken to examine the
novel user-interaction based feature extraction algorithm. On an individual application basis,
the approach can achieve recognition rates of 90%, with some users experiencing recogni-
tion performance of 100%. The consequence of this recognition is an enormous reduction
in the volume of traffic an investigator has to analyse, allowing them to focus upon a par-
ticular suspect or enabling them to disregard traffic and focus upon what is left.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
During the past 15 years, Internet usage has experienced
explosive growth and technological evolution – from a simple
data network with around 500 million users to a multipur-
pose and multiservice platform with almost 3.2 billion users
(Internetlivestats, 2015). Indeed, with the prevalence of various
broadband network technologies, mobile devices, and the
web, users can utilize a wide range of services to complete
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various personal and business tasks both in the office and on
the move 24/7. Services include (but are not limited to) enter-
tainment (e.g., watching online videos), communication (e.g.,
making VoIP calls), finance (e.g., online banking), data storage
(e.g., cloud services), office applications (e.g., Google Docs),
and even Operating Systems (e.g., ZeroPC). It is evidenced
that these activities generate a tremendous amount of IP
traffic – 60 Exabyte’s globally per month in 2014, 40% of
which originated from non-PC devices (Cisco, 2015).
While people and business take the full advantage of the
Internet, malicious attackers use the same infrastructure to
plot various cyberattacks (e.g., hacking, Denial of Service (DoS),
insider misuse, and phishing) against user’s information, cor-
poration’s servers, and Internet services. Indeed, there is an
ever-increasing volume of literature reporting the scale and
nature of the computer-related crime (both cyber and computer-
assisted). For example, the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center
reported 269,422 self-reported incidents of cyberattacks (mainly
fraud related) in 2014, with a total estimated loss of $800
million (FBI, 2015). The Verizon’s 2015 Data Breach Investiga-
tions Report shows that almost 80,000 security incidents were
discovered by 70 organizations around world in 2014, causing
them an estimated financial loss of $400 million (Verizon,
2015).
With the aim to search evidence and testify against cyber-
criminals, images of suspects’ digital devices are forensically
created and examined by investigators. For instance, statis-
tics from the FBI’s Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory
show that they had completed 6322 examinations and inves-
tigators testified in court and/or at hearing 88 times in 2014
(FBI, 2014). Due to the volatile nature of computer memory and
the availability of anti-forensic techniques (e.g., data wiping),
critical evidence can vanish when the computer is switched
off or purposely destroyed by the suspects as they have direct
access to their digital devices. As a result, a complete picture
of how an attack is conducted might not be achievable. As such,
independent sources of data, such as network traffic, provide
investigators with an invaluable source of evidence, where the
chance of the evidence being tampered or destroyed is
minimized.
Many tools (both commercial and open source) have been
designed and developed to assist network forensic examin-
ers to conduct investigations. These tools include NIKSUN’s
NetDetector Suite (NIKSUN, 2016), RSA’s Netwitness Suite
(RSA, 2016), Wireshark (Wireshark, 2016), PyFlag (Cohen, 2008),
and Xplico’s Open Source Network Forensic Analysis Tool
(Xplico, 2016). They all rely upon the IP address of the sus-
pect’s machine as a basis for the investigation, assuming IP
is static and linkable to an individual. However, IPs are in-
creasingly unreliable due to the mobile nature of devices and
the use of dynamic allocation of IP addresses. As a result,
beyond the detected attack (often a single IP packet or flow),
it is a challenge to investigate the question of what has hap-
pened in terms of the wider attack and who was actually
involved. Indeed, to identify and extract a specific user’s traffic
from the wider organization over a prolonged period is a
particularly challenging task.
Biometrics is a proven method that identifies individuals
based upon their physiological or behavioural traits. Several
biometric techniques, such as face recognition, fingerprint
identification, and speaker recognition, are already in wide use
within the forensic domain (Vezzani et al., 2013). However, little
research has been undertaken on identifying individuals using
biometric design techniques within the network forensic
domain. Existing research has largely focused upon merely pro-
viding network data (either in packet or flow forms) to identify
anomalous behaviour (a two-class problem of benign and ma-
licious traffic) rather than looking to identify particular
individuals (which is an n class problem, where n is the size
of the user population). Studies into behavioural profiling on
desktop and mobile platforms have demonstrated the ability
to verify an individual; however, deriving application-level in-
teractions (such as which websites users visit and more
importantly what they do whilst visiting – posting, chatting,
listening to music or watching video) from low-level en-
crypted packet-based data has proven challenging. Furthermore,
using these application-based interactions for identification
rather than verification introduces a need for stronger dis-
criminative information. To this end, this paper describes an
experimental study which proposes and investigates user iden-
tification through user’s application-level activities based solely
on the metadata of network packets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section
2 reviews existing network traffic analysis methods and the
prior art in behavioural profiling. Section 3 presents a novel
feature extraction approach to deriving user oriented appli-
cation level activities. The research methodology and the
formation of the user activity dataset are presented in Section
4, followed by a full experimental study to evaluate the ap-
proach in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the proposed approach
and its impact, while the conclusions and future work are high-
lighted in Section 7.
2. Prior art in network and
behavioural profiling
In order to fully understand the relationship between user’s
application level interactions and their corresponding network
signals, a detailed review on existing network traffic analysis
is discussed. The work into network traffic analysis can be
traced back to 1990s (Claffy et al., 1995; Debar et al., 1999)
and is utilized by network administrators in various domains,
including management, prioritization, performance, account-
ing, application behaviour analysis, and security (Hofstede
et al., 2014). Depending upon the granularity of the analysis,
network traffic can be analysed by two approaches: packet
based (finer grained) or flow based (coarser grained). The
packet based method is mainly used to examine the content
(i.e., the payload) of individual IP packets, while flow based
approach is utilized to analyse the summary of multiple IP
packets that share similar characteristics over a period of
time (i.e., IP flows). Details of these two methods, including
their working principles, existing research, and advantages
and disadvantages, are described. In addition, whilst behavioural
profiling has not been applied to network traffic, an analysis
of the prior art is presented to provide a baseline understand-
ing of the technique and the typical levels of performance
that can be expected.
336 c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 7 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 3 3 5 – 3 5 0
2.1. Packet based network analysis method
It is well-known that malicious attackers can use various data
fields of the IP packet (e.g., header and payload) to conceal in-
formation and plot different attacks via the network, including
malware, intrusions, and data exfiltration (Ahmed and Lhee,
2011; He et al., 2014; Wang and Stolfo, 2004). In order to detect
and deter these attacks, the packet based method (also known
as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)) is utilized to examine the
content (primarily the payload) of IP packets that passes a
network monitoring point on the fly. The IP packet content (in-
cluding IP addresses, port numbers, and payload information)
can be directly obtained from the network through either hard-
ware or software applications. The content is then instantly
analysed and compared with existing rulesets by using pattern
matching techniques (e.g., string matching or Self-Organizing
Map) (Bolzoni et al., 2006; Zanero, 2005). Any matches would
indicate the presence of an attack. Depending upon the ap-
plication in which the packet based analysis method is used,
a number of actions could be taken regarding the incident, such
as blocking the traffic or raising an alarm. Under this prin-
ciple, a number of studies were conducted to counter different
threats; examples of these studies, including their applica-
tions, matching methods, and performance, are summarized
in Table 1. Due to the time consuming nature of the pattern
matching technique and the increasing amount of data that
network devices need to process (e.g., Giga bits per second), a
wide range of research have been carried out to enhance the
performance and effectiveness of the packet based network
analysis based applications, including packet sampling tech-
niques (Jurga and Hulboj, 2007), hardware based solutions (Cho
et al., 2002; Dharmapurikar et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2009;
Sourdis et al., 2005), and novel algorithms (Dharmapurikar and
Lockwood, 2006; Liu et al., 2004; Lu et al., 2006; Smallwood and
Vance, 2011; Sun et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2006).
The packet based network analysis method can be effec-
tive against different network related attacks, such as malware
distribution, data exfiltration, DoS, and network intrusions.
Despite a wide range of methods being devised to improve the
performance, the packet inspection approach is still a time con-
suming process due to the bit-by-bit comparison nature; indeed,
to analyse gigabits of corporate network traffic within a frac-
tion of a second is a challenging task. Also, the widespread use
of SSL/TLS results in encrypted traffic requiring further efforts
to access the payload. Even in cases where it is possible to
obtain the payload in the plain text format, the decryption
process itself will introduce additional delays and be a
compromise on the confidentiality of the data. Moreover, it can
be challenging and laborious to interpret the raw payload data
into meaningful user related information (e.g., sending an
email).
2.2. Flow based network analysis approach
The flow based analysis approach relies upon the concept of
IP flows to detect various network attacks. A flow is the
summary of a group of IP packets that share a set of common
properties (e.g., source and destination IP addresses and port
numbers) passing a network observation point during a certain
timeframe (Claise, 2008). As a result, a typical flow record nor-
mally contains the following attributes: the time and date
stamps (that indicate the start and end of the flow), the IP ad-
dresses of the source and the destination, their port numbers,
the total size of the packet payload, the total number of IP
packets, and the type of protocols (e.g.,TCP or UDP).The network
flow record is created by a flow generation application rather
than obtained directly from the raw traffic. There are several
well-known flow generation applications in the field, includ-
ing Cisco’s NetFlow, sFlow, Juniper’s J-Flow, and IETF’s IPFIX
(Cisco, nd; Claise, 2008; Juniper, 2015; Sflow, 2015). Depending
upon the implementation and configuration of each indi-
vidual flow generation application, a flow record can be
completed when certain criteria are met, such as when the flow
is idle for a period time (e.g., 10 seconds), or the FIN or RST
flags are seen in the TCP traffic. Within a flow based network
monitoring system, the current traffic flow information is
quickly compared with historical flow data by using various
pattern classification techniques (e.g., neural networks or sta-
tistical models); any deviation (e.g., amount of data being sent
or the type of traffic being observed on a particular port number)
can be considered as a basis for alerting. According to this
theory, many methods and tools have been proposed and
devised within the flow based network analysis domain; a
number of selected examples, along with their applications,
pattern classification techniques and performance, are analysed
in Table 2. With the aim to deal with high speed network traffic,
a number of sampling techniques have been proposed for the
flow based analysis approach, including Estan and Varghese
(2003), Duffield et al. (2004), Duffield et al. (2005), Androulidakis
et al. (2007) and Canini et al. (2009).
Due to its ability to handle large volume of network traffic
(both encrypted and unencrypted) in a timely fashion, the flow
based network analysis approach has become the primary
method for security analysts to investigate different network
Table 1 – Examples of packet based network analysis works.
Studies Applications Performance
Mahoney and Chan (2001) Anomaly based network IDS 65% detection rate
Wang and Stolfo (2004) Anomaly based network IDS 100% detection rate with 0.1% false positive for port 80 traffic
Zanero (2005) Anomaly based network IDS 66.7% detection rate with 0.03% false positive
Wang et al. (2005) Zero-day worm detection Over 95% of detection rate with less than 0.5% of false positive
Bolzoni et al. (2006) Anomaly based network IDS 73.2% (detection rate) with less than 1% of false positive
Wang et al. (2006) Buffer overflow attack blocker 100% detection rate on HTTP traffic
Ahmed and Lhee (2011) Malware detection False negative (4.69%) and false positive (2.53%)
Al-Bataineh and White (2012) Detection of data exfiltration 99.97% detection rate on HTTP traffic
He et al. (2014) Detection of encrypted data exfiltration Close to 90% detection rate with less than 1% of false positives
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related issues, including malware distributions, network in-
trusions, DDoS attacks, and traffic classifications. However, as
it is a higher-level of abstraction and with the use of sam-
pling techniques, the flow based network analysis approach
losses the granularity of the traffic, such as the number of files
being downloaded by an attacker during a given period, or the
number of messages being sent by a user. Moreover, the per-
formance of the flow based network analysis approach could
be affected by the deployment of the DHCP, the usage of wire-
less technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi and 4G), the use of network proxies
by users (e.g., the Onion Router network), and the utilization
of IP spoofing technique.
As demonstrated above, the analysis of network traffic is
a well-established domain and has been widely used to detect
various network related attacks. Nonetheless, existing ap-
proaches experience an increasing set of challenges due to
multiple facets of the network environment. It is envisaged that
identifying users via their network activities/interactions rather
than IP traffic would offer additional information to network
forensic analysts when an incident occurs, such as how an
attack was formed, what actions the attacker carried out, and
more importantly who the attacker was.
2.3. Biometric-based behavioural profiling
Behavioural profiling is a biometric method that identifies users
based upon the way in which they interact with services/
systems on their IT devices. In general, user interactions can
be extracted from two levels: service/application-level (local)
or system-level (global). At the service level, user interactions
are more application specific. For example, within a tele-
phony application (e.g., Skype), the following user interactions
can be observed, including caller’s number, the time of calling,
and the duration of calling, while for a word-processing ap-
plication, user interactions include the name of the document,
the editing time, and the overall length of the document.
System-level user interactions are more generic, such as the
name of the running applications, the time of individual ap-
plication usage, and the amount of processing power being used.
Within a behavioural profiling system, user’s interactions are
compared with existing profile(s) that are created based upon
the historical service usage with their identity being verified/
identified based upon the comparison result.
Aupy and Clarke (2005) proposed a non-intrusive and con-
tinuous authentication method by monitoring user’s daily PC
usage (e.g., applications opened and websites browsed). Their
empirical study employed a private dataset, containing 21 users’
data over a two-month period. By using Feed Forward Multi-
Layered Perceptron neural network as the classifier method,
an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 7.1% was obtained. Song et al 2013
suggested an identification model by studying user’s system
level behaviour (e.g., process creation, registry key changes and
file system actions). Their evaluation was carried out on a
dataset with 18 users over four weeks on a Windows based com-
puter. Their system accuracies were in the range of 50%–90%
via their Gaussian mixture model classifier. Deutschmann and
Lindholm (2013) demonstrated a continuous authentication
system by observing user’s mouse movement, keystrokes and
application usage within an office environment. Their dataset
was captured from 99 users over a 10 week period. The devel-
oped trust model can detect an incorrect user in just over 1.5
minutes and allow correct users to work through a regular
working day. Li et al. (2014) presented an active authentica-
tion method for mobile devices by utilizing user’s application
interactions. Their system obtained an EER of 9.8% by using
the combination of a rule-based classifier, a dynamic profil-
ing technique and a smoothing function on a 76-user dataset.
As demonstrated above, studies have demonstrated that
users can be identified/verified via their interactions; and a good
level of performance is also observed. However, existing studies
were focused upon capturing information from the device itself
(i.e., via an agent installed on the computer or mobile device).
In terms of user network service interactions, Conti et al. (2016)
have suggested that user’s application actions can be identi-
fied by analysing the network traffic of their Android mobiles;
however, their analysis is based specifically on the analysis of
a very limited set of apps rather than an analysis of web-
based traffic – the nature of the resulting network signal being
very different. Furthermore, the study did not seek to use this
information as a basis for identifying users.
3. Deriving user interactions from
network metadata
The underlying premise or hypothesis of the proposed ap-
proach is that different user interactions within network-
based applications would result in network connections whose
composition would reveal a deterministic (or worst-case proba-
bilistic) measure that would intrinsically map to a specific user
action. For instance, when users chat via an instant messen-
ger application, it is intuitive that a longer datagram could
Table 2 – Examples of flow based network analysis studies.
Studies Applications Performance
Kim et al. (2004) Anomaly network detection The method could detect scanning and flooding attacks
Pao and Wang (2004) Signature based network IDS The method was able to detect the Ping sweep, DoS and port scan attacks.
Crotti et al. (2006) Traffic classification 99.4% and 97.5% detection rate for server’s and client’s HTTP traffic respectively
Song et al. (2006) Anomaly based network IDS 94% detection rate with 0.2% false positive
Muraleedharan et al. (2010) Anomaly based network IDS 100% detection rate on 15 attacks but with long delays
Braga et al. (2010) Anomaly based network IDS 99.11% detection rate and 0.46% false alarm rate
Winter et al. (2011) Anomaly based network IDS 98% detection rate
Tegeler et al. (2012) Malware detection system 90% detection rate with 0.1% false positive rate
Jadidi et al. (2013) Anomaly based network IDS 99.43% accuracy rate
Hofstede et al. (2013) Anomaly based network IDS 95% detection rate with 1% false positive rate
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indicate a larger amount of characters being sent during the
conversation. Using flow-based network analysis is not suffi-
cient because more than one user interaction might exist within
a single flow. For example, with TLS-based connections, the TLS
session remains open for a period of time (to remove the over-
head in creating the session) which results in many user
interactions being possible within a single flow. Conversely, a
packet-based approach does not provide the necessary ab-
straction required to understand the nature of the user
interaction. Understanding what a user is actually doing pro-
vides the basis for subsequently using the information to profile
and identify them.
Based upon this working hypothesis, a series of experi-
ments were conducted to investigate the relationship between
user activities/interactions and the corresponding network
signals that result within various Internet based services. To
aid this process and provide a starting point for the analysis,
nine of the most popular Internet services were identified
(Alexa, 2016). In each application, all possible user interac-
tions were identified – resulting in Table 3. A deductive
methodology was then applied to identify whether each in-
teraction identified resulted in a unique network signature and
if it did, what the discerning parameters were. This was per-
formed on a manual basis – using Wireshark to capture the
traffic and perform the analysis. To provide a level of rigor and
verification in this process, each interaction was captured at
least 10 times (with particular interactions such as chatting
resulting in a larger number of captures to investigate the role
of the length of the message on the resulted network traffic).
This was also then repeated by three independent research-
ers working in a blind mode (i.e., they were not privy to the
results of the observations made by the other researchers). The
results were then combined and verified.
A list of the network metadata parameters utilized for the
analysis was as follows: the date and time stamp, the IP address
of the source and destination, the port numbers, protocol ID
(either TCP or UDP), the length of a datagram, and several TCP
flags (e.g., SYN, FIN, ACK and PUSH). According to the packet
sending rate, user actions over a secured communication (e.g.,
HTTPS) can be represented in three forms via their network
metadata: a single packet, multiple packets, and a stream of
packets. User’s Internet activities over a plain-text traffic can
be observed according to the SYN and FIN flags of the TCP pro-
tocol; as a result, the majority of user’s unsecured traffic will
be interpreted as a stream of packets. Both directions of network
traffic were analysed, as it was envisaged that the nature of
the returning traffic from the Internet service could also provide
meaningful information as to the nature of the interaction.
In order to aid in understanding the nature of the analy-
sis, three examples are provided that represent the single,
multiple, and streamed packet contexts.
Example 1: single packet analysis
For certain interactions, when a user activity is carried out, a
single packet with the same payload length and TCP flag status
occurs. For example, the length of a chatting message can be
identified within the Skype service. The packet length is com-
posed of a baseline set of characters. In the example illustrated
in Fig. 1, this is 794 bytes with three messages with 8, 30, 23
characters being sent from the client to the receiving party.
Upon repeating this experiment, it is noticed that the base-
line set does vary between users and thus a threshold will need
to be identified on a per-user basis in order to identify this in-
teraction. Another example, a single TCP packet with a length
of 937-byte is sent by the Hotmail server to the client when a
recipient is added to or removed from an email conversation
(including new, reply, and forward). A third example observed
shows that two individual TCP packets with length of 60 bytes
and 95 bytes are sent from the Dropbox server to the client
when a document is shared.
Example 2: multiple packet analysis
User activities can also be observed in the form of multiple
packets (normally between 2 and 4 packets). These packets are
being sent in less than a millisecond timeframe. For instance,
within the chatting service of Facebook, two TCP packets with
lengths of 1434 and 68 bytes are sent from the client to the server
when the typing activity is commenced (as illustrated in Fig. 2).
In the same figure, different lengths of packets (i.e., 1169 bytes
and 333 bytes) are observed when the same user activity is
carried out. Nonetheless, the total length of the two sets of
packets is the same (i.e. 1502 bytes). The baseline for chatting
on Facebook is a total of 2625 bytes (i.e. 1434 + 1191). For example,
when a 4-character word is sent to the server, a total of 2629
bytes appeared on the network. Another example is that when
a user edits the Spreadsheet application of Google Docs online,
two TCP packets with lengths of 1434 and 912 bytes are sent from
the client to the server; and the server replies with two packets
with lengths 111/112 and 159 bytes (as illustrated in Fig. 3).
Example 3: streamed packet analysis
The third user interaction pattern can be presented in the style
of a stream of packets when certain user activities are performed.
Table 3 – Services and user interactions.
Services User interactions
BBC Page navigation, watch video clips/TV programs, listen to audio clips/radio, comment, news sharing
Dropbox Download/upload files, share files/folders, folder navigations
Facebook; Twitter Post, comment, share, find friends, attach files, chat, typing message, like
Google Keyword search, page navigation, create/edit/share/delete online documents
Hotmail Download/upload file attachments, compose/reply/forward/delete an email, insert recipients, read emails
Skype Send text messages, file transfer, click on contacts, audio/video call, change online presence
YouTube Search, watch videos, listen to songs, upload songs/videos, like, dislike, comment
Wikipedia Search, read/modify an article, upload media files
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These packets are sent within the range of microseconds (e.g.,
50 microseconds) from each other in a continuous fashion; and
normally they have same or similar payload lengths. The most
common example is user’s uploading or downloading activi-
ties: in the case of uploading, streams of Maximum Transmission
Unit (MTU) size packets are sent from the user’s computer to
the server; while the server only replies with acknowledge-
ment packets. Another example is when users have a video-
conference via Skype. As demonstrated in Fig. 4, the connection
is set up directly between two clients via UDP ports (i.e., not via
the Skype server). During the video conference, one client was
sending larger size packets (e.g., 1166–1360 byte video frames)
while the other was sending much smaller packets (e.g., 138–149
bytes voice frames) as the former client had the camera turned
on while the latter did not.
A summary of the experimental results on selected common
user interactions from the aforementioned Internet service is
presented in Table 4. Obviously many user actions can be per-
formed via thousands of Internet based services and this study
only manually analysed a number of common user interac-
tions from 9 popular applications. Nevertheless, these results
in Table 4 along with the information illustrated in Figs 1–4
provide enough evidence suggesting that user’s application level
activities can be presented by their corresponding network level
metadata, without needing to check the payload, hence pro-
tecting user’s privacy and reducing the computation power
required. It should also be highlighted that the nature of the
resulting signatures are focused upon the core user interac-
tion (i.e., the messaging component, the payload of a voice call)
rather than utilizing a wider set of network flows/interactions
Fig. 1 – User chatting over Skype.
Fig. 2 – User chatting on Facebook.
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Fig. 3 – User editing a Spreadsheet on Google Docs.
Fig. 4 – Video conferencing via Skype.
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that exist within the majority of web applications. This results
in a targeting upon the flows that actually link to the user, rather
than to advertisements or supplementary data. This also helps
to alleviate any issues resulting from plugins that might block
content (e.g., AdBlock). Furthermore, in order to identify indi-
viduals from the network traffic, it is not necessary to profile
every Internet-based application but merely those that repre-
sent a significant volume of the user’s traffic – which the top
applications do. It should be highlighted that whilst it is ex-
pected that web-based interactions will be identical when
using desktop/laptop web browsers, the interactions coming
from mobile applications (e.g., Facebook via a web browser
and via a mobile app) are likely to be a little different, which
would result in needing to also profile popular mobile
applications.
Given the integrated nature of many web applications, it is
also expected that one service might connect to another. For
example, watching a YouTube video on the BBC website. In this
approach, these two activities will be separately identified as
a BBC and YouTube interaction, rather than a series of BBC in-
teractions. Whilst a level of granularity will be lost, the
fundamental nature of the interaction or behaviour is still being
captured and therefore it should have minimal impact. Fur-
thermore, whilst in some instances it was not possible to
uniquely identify the interaction through a deterministic
approach. It would however still be possible to apply a proba-
bilistic approach to these, as each interaction can only belong
to a subset of possibilities. Understanding the likelihood of each
would provide a basis for labelling the interaction. However,
this research did not continue to perform the probabilistic analy-
sis, as the deterministic results have provided sufficient user-
based information from which to derived and apply behavioural
profiling.
However, furthering this line of research could provide an
invaluable approach to providing forensic investigators with
a rich and abstracted set of information about what users are
actually doing on their computers using an independent source
of evidence.
4. Network data collection dataset
To provide a basis for evaluating whether the aforemen-
tioned user actions can provide a reliable basis for identifying
users, a dataset is required. To provide scientific rigour and sta-
tistical reliability, the following criteria were established:
(a) The dataset must contain a sufficient number of par-
ticipants to provide a basis for identifying them;
(b) The dataset must contain sufficient samples across a pro-
longed period in order to ensure identification
performance can be maintained;
(c) All network traffic meta-data from all participants is to
be collected;
(d) The IP address and user must be fixed for the com-
plete duration in order to provide a ground truth to which
to label the interactions and calculate the performance.
Table 4 – User interactions – key characteristics.
Services User interactions No. of packets Total length (bytes) Main direction
BBC Page navigation Stream Various Server > Client
Watching video clips Stream MTU (approx) Server > Client
Listening to audio clips or radio Stream MTU (approx) Server > Client
Dropbox Download files Stream MTU (approx) Server > Client
Upload files Stream MTU (approx) Client > server
Folder navigations Multiple 155 Server > Client
Facebook Page loading Stream Various Server > Client
Attach files Stream MTU (approx) Client > server
Chat Multiple 2625+ Client > Server
Typing Multiple 1502 Client > Server
Hotmail File attachments Stream MTU (approx) Client > server
Compose an email One 981 Server > Client
Insert a recipient One 937 Server > client
Remove a recipient One 937 Server > client
Google Docs Editing document Multiple 2309 Client > Server
Editing Spreadsheet Multiple 2346 Client > Server
Google Search Page navigation Multiple 268 Server > Client
Skype Text messages One 794+ Client > Server
Audio calls Stream Approx 140 Both Clients
Video calls Stream Approx 1250 Both Clients
File transfer Stream MTU (approx) Sending Client > receiving client
Click on contacts One 731 Client > Server
Idle One 572 Client > Server
Twitter Page loading Stream Various Server > Client
Uploading Photo Steam MTU (approx) Client > Server
Twitter One 1267+ Client > Server
Wikipedia Page loading Stream Various Server > Client
YouTube Watch videos Stream MTU (approx) Server > Client
Video upload Stream MTU (approx) Client > Server
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Unfortunately, existing public datasets, including the DARPA
datasets (MIT, 2015), the Cyber Defence Exercise dataset
(Sangster et al., 2009), the Kyoto dataset (Song et al., 2011), the
SimpleWeb’s (2015) datasets, and the University of New Bruns-
wick (UNB) ISCX datasets (UNB, 2015), are either dated or were
created for specific purposes (e.g., network intrusion detec-
tion or malware detection) rather than user identification.
Therefore, a new dataset was required.
4.1. Data collection
In total, 46 users completed the data collection process during
the period of 12 November 2014 to 20 January 2015. 18 users’
data were collected via a network-based approach as they were
full-time PhD students within the same research laboratory.
All traffic on the network metadata was monitored and cap-
tured. To ensure the relationship between the IP addresses and
users, DHCP was disabled and all IPs were fixed for the dura-
tion of the study. The remaining participants were recruited
from the local student population via a standalone applica-
tion installed on their personal machines. Whilst the sample
population is not representative of the general population, it
was specifically selected as graduate and post-graduate stu-
dents share a common purpose (i.e. studying) are therefore more
likely to share similarities in their Internet use than would be
expected more generally. As such, arguably this population rep-
resents a more difficult classification task than would be
anticipated from a wider population. It also more accurately
reflects the behaviours you would expect of staff working for
the same organization. All participants were explicitly asked
not to share their systems with other people during the col-
lection period. Due to the nature of the study (i.e., collection
of user’s network activities), ethical approval was obtained and
approved in advance of any data collection.
At the end of the collection process, a total of 112 Giga-
bytes of IP header information was accumulated. Each user’s
data were stored in an individual SQLite database file, and each
record contains the following fields: a date and time stamp (e.g.,
2015.01.15.22:38:05.587341), sender’s IP address, sender’s port
number, receiver’s IP address, receiver’s port number, the packet
length, the type of the traffic (e.g., TCP) and the flags (e.g., SYN
and FIN).
4.2. Data pre-processing
The raw network traffic metadata was processed by applying
the signatures obtained of the user interactions. This was
achieved by identifying the nine core services using IP look up
and subsequently applying the signatures to the resulting
metadata. Table 5 presents an overview of the resulting inter-
actions per service across the total population. As illustrated
in the table, not all users exhibited use across all nine ser-
vices (as would be expected); however, it is clear that a sufficient
number of users and interactions do exist to provide a basis
for performing a study on user identification.
Ultimately, the objective for pre-processing is to focus upon
the user-based interaction data, whilst removing machine-to-
machine network protocol traffic, with the specific purpose of
extracting the user discriminative information. This results in
a dataset with a higher proportion of user related informa-
tion and significantly reduces the volume of data that needs
to be analysed further – reducing the time and computa-
tional overhead of processing every packet for identification.
The 112 GBs of metadata represents a total of 1.38 billion
packets. Once the feature extraction is applied, this reduces
to a total of 5,417,823 interactions, representing a 96.1% re-
duction in data.
5. User identification via network interactions
The purpose of the experiment is to determine whether the
use of user interactions provided a basis to successfully iden-
tify users. It is typical in many biometric studies to investigate
the nature of the classifier, in particular focusing upon the op-
timization problem to minimize the resulting classification
errors. However, given the large volume of data within the
dataset, an exhaustive iterative classifier optimization design
methodology was not deemed appropriate (or would not be
completed in a timely manner). As such, a preliminary experi-
ment focusing upon subsets of the dataset was undertaken to
determine appropriate classifier configurations – whilst not
optimal, the subsequent results do still provide a strong indi-
cation as to the overall performance that can be achieved.
5.1. Preliminary experiment: classification configuration
In order to successfully identify users through their service in-
teractions to answer the who question for network forensic
investigations, a classifier that can discriminate individual users
based upon their behavioural patterns is required. Several Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) techniques, such as Feedforward Multi-
Layer Perceptron (FF MLP) neural network, Radial Basis Function
neural network, and Self-Organizing Map, can all be utilized
in the pattern classification domain (Jain et al., 1996). Amongst
them, FF MLP is often chosen as the default classifier as pre-
vious studies demonstrated that a better performance was
obtained over other techniques within the biometric authen-
tication domain (Clarke and Furnell, 2006; Iranmanesh et al.,
2014; Li et al., 2014; Saevanee et al., 2015; Sibai et al., 2013; Svozil
et al., 1997).
The two key parameters that required configuration with
a FF MLP network are the training algorithm and the number
of neurons. A third parameter involving a methodological aspect
Table 5 – An overview of user interactions dataset.
Services Users Total no. of
interactions
% of
interactions
BBC 30 44,847 0.8%
Dropbox 31 116,989 2.2%
Facebook 46 1,619,651 29.9%
Google 46 878,418 16.2%
Hotmail 45 303,088 5.6%
Skype 31 260,611 4.8%
Twitter 46 231,639 4.3%
Wikipedia 44 17,046 0.3%
YouTube 45 1,945,534 35.9%
Total: 5,417,823 100%
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was also included in the investigation – the minimum number
of interactions required by a participant in order to be in-
cluded in the analysis. Including users with particularly low
numbers of interactions for a service would not provide suf-
ficient samples to perform training or testing of the classifier.
To reduce the overhead of processing all data, the BBC service
was selected – as a service with lower volumes of interaction
data but with sufficient data to make an analysis meaning-
ful. The data were randomly split 60/40 into training and test
datasets respectively. Whilst random sampling does not reflect
real-world use, for these purposes it was deemed appropri-
ate to obtain an overview of the complete dataset for both
training and testing. Given typically high levels of variability
in feature vectors of behavioural-based biometrics, this removes
the need to consider template retraining.
A total of 315 tests were conducted through varying the fol-
lowing parameters:
• Minimum numbers of interaction – 50, 100, 150, 200 and 250
• Training algorithms – Levenberg–Marquardt, BFGS Quasi-
Newton, Resilient Backpropagation, Scaled Conjugate
Gradient, Conjugate Gradient with Powell/Beale Restarts,
Fletcher–Powell Conjugate Gradient, Polak–Ribiére Conju-
gate Gradient, One Step Secant, and Variable Learning Rate
Backpropagation
• Number of neurons – 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, and 140
Due to a number of factors (such as the complexity of the
problem and the number of data points), it is difficult to know
which training algorithm from the 9 chosen would be suit-
able for a given problem (MathWorks, 2017). Nonetheless, an
analysis of the training algorithms (as illustrated in Fig. 5) clearly
shows the Levenberg–Marquardt backpropagation algorithm
consistently outperforming the other training algorithms across
a range of network sizes for solving the issue of user identi-
fication. Using this as a basis, Fig. 6 presents the results of
varying network sizes against the minimum number of inter-
actions. The performance of the classifier increases slightly
when the network size gets larger for user interaction thresh-
old settings 150, 200 and 250; however, under the same
configurations, longer training times for the FF MLP neural
network and the need for additional computational resources
are also observed. The best performance of 75.5% True Posi-
tive Identification Rate (TPIR) is obtained under the network
with 60 neurons and 250 minimal number of user interac-
tions. This suggests that network size does not have a large
impact upon the overall performance that can be achieved
(a smaller network size is preferable due to computation over-
heads). What is clear is the number of interactions does have
a direct impact, with a significant increase in performance being
achieved – an increase of 16% in the identification rate is ex-
perienced between 50 and 250 interactions. Notably, the rate
of improvement significantly reduces as the number of
minimum interactions is increased. This suggests that whilst
increasing the minimum number of interactions further still
might result in better levels of performance, the level of im-
provement is likely only to be slight.
5.2. Experiment
Utilizing the configuration information obtained from the pre-
liminary study, a complete evaluation was undertaken
investigating the feasibility of identifying users across the nine
Internet-based services. The study involved all 46 partici-
pants across the two-months of data collection period. For all
9 services, the Levenberg–Marquardt backpropagation is chosen
as the training function, with a network size of 40 neurons and
a minimum of 200 user interactions in order to achieve a rea-
sonable level of performance (i.e., 71.4% TPIR) versus ensuring
sufficient data are available within the dataset. The minimum
number of user interactions is utilized to identify which users
are eligible to be included within the identification model. Sixty
percent of 200 samples are then randomly selected for use in
training the classifier. All remaining samples (at least 40% of
200 but more in many users) are then used for testing the
dataset to calculate the performance. At no stage is a sample
used for both training and testing datasets.This methodological
Fig. 5 – Performance achieved by varying the learning
algorithm versus network size.
Fig. 6 – Comparison of performance with varying network
sizes and minimum number of user interactions (via
Levenberg–Marquardt backpropagation).
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approach permitted a fixed training dataset where each user
was given an identical number of training samples – this would
reduce any skewing effects that would exist if the model simply
permitted 60% of a user’s interactions to be used for training
(e.g., user X would have 600 training samples versus user Y with
only 120 samples, assuming user X has 1000 samples while user
Y has 200 samples in total). The test dataset however is vari-
able based upon the remaining samples that are present (with
a minimum of 80 samples (40% of 200) but in practice going
up to user X with 840 samples). This provides for a fairer as-
sessment of the overall performance that can be achieved.Three
levels of TPIRs, top 1, 3 and 5, are set for ranking the perfor-
mance accuracy. For instance, a top 3 result indicates that a
user’s interaction was identified within the highest 3 of the
classifier’s output results.
For each service, a single FF MLP network was created with
9 inputs, 40 hidden neurons and 46 outputs – with the highest
value amongst the 46 positions indicating which the network
deemed to be the user belonging to that sample. Networks were
trained until the training conditions were met (e.g., 1000 epochs
had been completed or 6 maximum validation failures had been
reached). The inputs to the network were:
• Start time of interaction: 2014.12.09.10:45:23.769053
• End time of interaction: 2014.12.09.10:45:23.817927
• Source port number: 59477
• Service IP address: 212.58.246.93
• Service port number: 443
• Number of packets sent from source to destination: 2
• Total size of packets sent from source to destination: 1850
• Number of packets sent from destination to source: 10
• Total size of packets sent from destination to source: 13,419
The source IP address is not utilized at all in the identifi-
cation process. This is a key differentiating factor over existing
packet and flow based detection studies.
The overall results of the identification are presented in
Table 6, with an average TPIR (Top 1) rate of 48% increasing to
66% (TPIR Top 5). Whilst in terms of identification systems, this
is unacceptably low, its purpose in this context is to reduce the
volume of traffic an investigator needs to analyse. Removing
even 50% will have a huge impact. The table also includes the
number of interactions this results are based upon (i.e., the size
of the test dataset), showing this was based upon an average
of 115,000 interactions per user – over 5 million in total.
In terms of individual users, the best top 1 ranking perfor-
mances are 86.3%, 81.8% and 73.9% for users 39, 24 and 41
respectively, with the best rank 5 results of 96.8%, 92.3% and
90.7% for users 34, 24/31 and 41. The worst performing users
included users 2 (12.6%), 4 (19.2%) and 21 (16%) rank 1 TPIR.
Table 6 – Overall identification results for each user with all services.
User ID Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TNUI 5,285,384 9,835 82,165 27,666 441,831 104,086 58,469 72,374
Top 1 (%) 47.5 62.8 12.6 32.8 19.2 69.2 51.5 23.1
Top 3 (%) 60.5 74.1 46.7 47.0 51.0 71.4 70.8 42.1
Top 5 (%) 66.0 76.6 70.5 55.4 72.0 73.7 84.8 52.8
User ID 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
TNUI 83,873 310,364 34,310 40,496 171,949 50,776 34,337 147,776
Top 1 (%) 43.8 42.9 39.1 39.6 26.8 42.7 42.2 39.2
Top 3 (%) 57.5 57.0 44.6 42.7 45.4 56.7 47.4 55.6
Top 5 (%) 61.3 62.3 47.8 43.9 54.3 63.8 48.3 61.0
User ID 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
TNUI 8,492 1,992 24,701 71,610 118,655 28,328 732 64,955
Top 1 (%) 29.9 59.4 41.6 49.7 28.6 16.0 47.0 29.0
Top 3 (%) 36.9 62.3 59.3 59.6 34.9 35.5 51.1 38.1
Top 5 (%) 38.6 63.0 71.8 67.9 37.4 50.0 54.2 43.9
User ID 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
TNUI 97,688 16,936 36,248 21,828 24,232 296,048 65,628 319,239
Top 1 (%) 81.8 54.7 27.1 67.1 41.0 43.4 51.6 68.6
Top 3 (%) 90.1 65.6 40.5 70.7 54.5 58.5 63.5 87.9
Top 5 (%) 92.3 67.2 48.3 70.9 61.6 67.2 66.3 92.3
User ID 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
TNUI 961,357 206,768 95,501 150,750 26,297 113,918 137,543 2,270
Top 1 (%) 51.9 32.9 73.7 56.4 51.0 31.1 59.6 86.3
Top 3 (%) 68.8 40.4 94.4 73.6 53.4 46.0 83.6 88.8
Top 5 (%) 74.1 45.6 96.8 77.9 55.1 50.6 87.6 89.1
User ID 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
TNUI 104,722 16,662 13,952 97,848 290,472 87,754 111,951
Top 1 (%) 56.7 73.9 46 64.1 63.5 67.4 45.9
Top 3 (%) 69.5 87.0 47.8 73.7 79.1 86.8 72.8
Top 5 (%) 73.8 90.7 48.4 76.7 81.3 90.0 77.8
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However, reflecting upon their performance at rank 5 shows
an increase to 70.5% (user 2), 72% (user 4) and 50% (user 21),
demonstrating a reasonable to high level of identification rate.
An analysis of the results per service rather than indi-
vidual shows Skype, BBC and Hotmail as the top three in terms
of recognition performance. Notably, in all three cases, the popu-
lation sample is lower than in other services such as Google,
Facebook and YouTube, which achieved lower rank 1 perfor-
mances (of between 44 and 54%). Again, reflecting upon their
rank 5 performance and the percentages increase to encour-
aging levels (65–73%). It is also worth highlighting that
population size is only one of the factors, with the nature and
range of the feature vector being another. Where services have
performed well (in rank 1) they tend to have a richer set of pos-
sible user interactions (when compared to the interactions
presented in Table 4).
Rather than using all services, a forensic investigator might
wish to restrict the filtering of network traffic based upon the
best performing services, in order to be more confident about
the identity of the traffic. Table 7 presents the performance and
name of the service for the top three services. Thirty-five of
the forty-six participants have a first service performance over
80% or greater, providing a rigorous approach.These highly posi-
tive identifications can be used to confirm the user’s IP
address(es) which can in turn be used to filter and analyse the
traffic.
An analysis of the second and third top services (from
Table 8) also shows a number of users with significantly high
identifications rates – 19 users with 80% or greater with second
and 9 users in third. Skype, Hotmail, Facebook, BBC and Google
are the most recurrent services listed in the top three ser-
vices amongst all users.
6. Discussion
The need to identify and map network traffic to individuals
is a key requirement in order to be able to investigate the who.
Or indeed, even when the who is known, this research would
enable the identification of relevant traffic in an IP-independent
and more timely fashion, enabling the what and how. The
contribution of this paper is not to present a complete solu-
tion where traffic is identified and merely extracted for
investigation but rather to provide an additional layer of analy-
sis where the traffic can be labelled and prioritized for analysis
by the investigator (i.e., more or less likely to belong to a par-
ticular user). The solution is seeking to reduce the time taken
and cognitive load upon an investigator. As such, the re-
search question becomes less about just the recognition
performance and more about how this leads to a reduction in
the analysis required, although of course the two aspects are
linked.
The results have presented a series of analyses that show
that the use of user interactions is a reliable means of creat-
ing a behavioural profile. The performance achieved in these
experiments are certainly in line with if not exceeding in many
cases previous research conducted in behavioural profiling
(Fridman et al., 2016; Li et al., 2014). Unfortunately, a direct com-
parison to prior research in flow-based approaches is not
possibly due to the research having focused upon anomaly de-
tection (a 2-class problem) rather than identification (a n-class
problem). Additional, prior work is focused upon using the user’s
IP address within the classifier – something this research spe-
cifically sought not to do. However, to provide a basis for
understanding the value of interactions versus flows, a further
experiment was conducted. The data flows and interactions
from the Dropbox service were extracted and processed (in-
line with the aforementioned experimental methodology in
Section 5). The results of the experiment are presented in
Table 9. As can be seen, the interaction-based approach out-
performs the flow-based approach by approximately 10% at rank
1 TPIR, with the gap shrinking for tops 3 and 5. This suggests
the interaction-based processing provides for a more discrimi-
native feature-set than the flow-based approach.
The use of interactions introduces a number of benefits over
existing approaches that include:
• Reduction in the volume of traffic that needs to be pro-
cessed by the classification system over packet-based
approaches and an increase in granularity over flow-
based approaches
• Focusing upon the user rather than the packet or flow, en-
abling a clear picture of what the user is doing at the
application-level
• Privacy preserving as only metadata is captured and
analysed, although in practice an investigation might wish
to inspect the traffic (if possible)
• Encryption independent – linked with privacy, the lack of
DPI techniques removes the restriction and need to decrypt
traffic prior to processing (which can be a significant pro-
cessing burden)
Whilst the preliminary study has resulted in a promising
set of results, two key areas require further thought and con-
sideration: scalability and training data. The model utilized in
this experiment had to deal with identifying a maximum of
46 users. In practice, it would be expected that the approach
would need to successfully differentiate between hundreds (and
with particularly large centralized Enterprise organizations,
thousands). It is unlikely a single FF MLP as designed in this
experiment would be sufficient to provide the necessary clas-
sification.Whilst the results in Table 8 show that the recognition
performance of the top service is on average 87%, the in-
creased volume of data and the need for the classifier to process
and discriminate would place a significant burden upon the
system. Further work is required on designing models that
Table 7 – The overall performance for each individual
service.
Services Number of users Top 1 (%) Top 3 (%) Top 5 (%)
BBC 11 73.1 83.7 88.5
Dropbox 19 42.2 54.7 62.8
Facebook 43 49.8 62.8 68.3
Google 44 53.8 67.5 72.6
Hotmail 28 68.3 72.5 74.0
Skype 23 90.3 92.5 93.2
Twitter 42 43.5 50.2 53.3
Wikipedia 17 63.5 71.3 74.7
YouTube 44 44.0 58.7 65.2
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operate in more of a scalable-independent fashion. For example,
a new system utilises a verification model per user (i.e., a two-
class problem) with the resultant output from each user-
based verification classifier feeding into a fusion model to
determine the most likely user ID. In this manner, the discrimi-
native effort is distributed through the use of N two-class
classifiers with a single fusion engine looking to merge the result.
This leads to the second area for further work – how to train
the classifier. In this study, an assumption was made that train-
ing data were available in order to perform supervised training
of the classifier. Whilst for the purposes of this research – to
evaluate the usefulness of user interactions being derived from
network metadata – it was normal to assume and label the
traffic, in practice the question of where do these data come
from exists. Indeed, this is a common problem across
behavioural profiling studies and the wider anomaly detec-
tion work performed within Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).
Typically, researchers merely refer to the requirement that at
some point (typically at the beginning of use) data are col-
lected and assumed to belong (either to a user or is not
anomalous) (Chun, 2016). For behavioural studies where the
system is merely looking to verify an individual, whilst still open
Table 8 – Top 3 services per user.
User ID Top 1 TPIR (%) Top 2 TPIR (%) Top 3 TPIR (%)
1 Google 90.0 Twitter 63.0 YouTube 57.7
2 Wiki 83.0 BBC 77.0 Dropbox 41.8
3 Hotmail 99.4 Google 76.5 Twitter 60.0
4 Hotmail 92.4 Google 58.3 Dropbox 41.4
5 YouTube 71.7 Google 62.9 Facebook 52.6
6 Skype 99.4 Hotmail 94.5 Google 82.6
7 Google 48.3 YouTube 18.5 Facebook 16.9
8 Twitter 57.9 Google 50.8 Facebook 43.7
9 Skype 97.6 Wiki 92.4 Hotmail 75.6
10 Skype 100.0 Hotmail 83.3 Facebook 55.2
11 Skype 97.2 Hotmail 65.6 Facebook 56.9
12 Skype 99.6 BBC 88.9 Dropbox 83.1
13 Facebook 62.3 Dropbox 55.5 Google 37.9
14 Skype 96.4 Hotmail 76.9 Twitter 51.9
15 Google 60.4 Wiki 58.9 YouTube 42.7
16 Wiki 94.5 YouTube 81.6 Google 75.4
17 YouTube 61.8 Google 57.5 – –
18 YouTube 87.2 BBC 84.8 Facebook 69.4
19 Skype 88.2 Hotmail 78.3 BBC 51.8
20 Facebook 56.8 Wiki 54.1 Google 44.5
21 Hotmail 99.5 Twitter 88.8 Facebook 77.0
22 Google 47.8 YouTube 47.2 – –
23 Wiki 69.0 Twitter 68.3 Google 63.8
24 Skype 97.1 Hotmail 94.8 BBC 93.0
25 Dropbox 99.6 Google 81.8 Facebook 51.6
26 Google 76.9 Twitter 51.5 YouTube 31.5
27 Skype 98.4 Hotmail 96.0 Twitter 70.6
28 Hotmail 98.1 Skype 93.8 Google 90.4
29 Skype 82.8 YouTube 61.8 BBC 55.8
30 Skype 95.2 Facebook 66.0 Hotmail 61.7
31 Skype 98.6 Hotmail 87.7 Google 87.4
32 Skype 77.5 Facebook 71.5 BBC 58.9
33 Skype 98.4 Wiki 66.8 Hotmail 55.8
34 Skype 100.0 Dropbox 94.8 BBC 93.1
35 Skype 98.0 Wiki 79.4 Hotmail 71.8
36 Google 84.7 Hotmail 76.1 YouTube 63.8
37 BBC 80.1 YouTube 71.0 Hotmail 50.2
38 Skype 94.9 BBC 89.1 Hotmail 78.9
39 Google 92.6 Dropbox 92.5 Twitter 90.7
40 Skype 96.8 YouTube 94.5 BBC 85.1
41 Twitter 89.3 Google 77.7 YouTube 63.1
42 Skype 100.0 Hotmail 88.1 Google 80.1
43 Skype 98.7 Twitter 92.6 Hotmail 51.5
44 Skype 90.9 Wiki 74.0 Google 72.6
45 Hotmail 90.0 Google 83.8 Facebook 74.2
46 Skype 100.0 Hotmail 59.2 YouTube 57.2
Table 9 – Performance comparison between flow and
interaction based approaches on user’s Dropbox traffic.
Top 1 (%) Top 3 (%) Top 5 (%)
Flow based approach 49.3 64.9 74.2
Interaction based approach 59.8 70.3 76.3
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to error, this is acceptable (as is the case for anomaly detection
in IDSs). However, it is not possible to do so in an identification
task – it would require the organization to fix IP addresses to
static – which if merely left in place would remove the need for
the approach as IP would be a reliable indicator of the user. As
such, further work needs to be undertaken in investigating ap-
proaches that can cluster interactions through a mix-model
approach of both unsupervised and supervised learning.
Whilst the focus of this research has been the classifica-
tion of users without using the source (or user’s) IP address,
because of mobile devices and DHCP, in practice, the IP address
is likely to be static in small time windows (up to a couple of
minutes). Therefore, through the use of services with a high
recognition performance, to provide a strong confidence of a
particular user’s IP address, this could then be used to asso-
ciate any other traffic coming from or to that address within
the time window – identifying further traffic which was not
identifiable being successfully labelled.The intelligence gleaned
from the recognition provides a strong indicator to enable in-
vestigators to examine certain aspects of the network traffic.
7. Conclusion and future work
This paper has presented and evaluated a novel feature ex-
traction approach for network traffic that provides robust user
identification. Through the removal of non-user related infor-
mation and the transformation of features to focus specifically
on application-level user interactions the study has shown this
provides sufficient discriminative capacity to reliably iden-
tify individuals – particularly in services where a richer
interaction environment exists. This information will provide
an invaluable source of intelligence for a forensic investigator/
incident analyst to more effectively filter, refine and identify
relevant network traffic.
As the discussion highlighted, scalability and identifying
initial training data are both areas for future work. This will
lead to the development of a next generation Network Foren-
sic Analysis Tool (NFAT) that is capable of analysing network
traffic and presenting filtering upon users (rather than IP ad-
dresses), abstracting the user actions to permit an investigator
to appreciate what the nature of the traffic is from an appli-
cation perspective.
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